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Abstract
Often philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians employ a
notion of intended structure when talking about a branch of math-
ematics. In addition, we know that there are foundational math-
ematical theories that can find representatives for the objects of
informal mathematics. In this paper, we examine how faithfully
foundational theories can represent intended structures, and show
that this question is closely linked to the decidability of the the-
ory of the intended structure. We argue that this sheds light on
the trade-off between expressive power and meta-theoretic prop-
erties when comparing first-order and second-order logic.
Introduction
This paper addresses the philosophical question of how well founda-
tional mathematical theories are able to represent mathematical struc-
tures. Much of mathematical practice concerns the study of partic-
ular structures. Famous examples are the arithmetical structure of
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the natural numbers (N, +,×, 0, 1,<), the ordered field of the reals
(R, +,×, 0, 1,<), or the field of complex numbers (C, +,×, 0, 1). The
study of these structures is conducted mainly informally, such as the
manner of reasoning we see in mathematical journals.
This fact concerning mathematical practice is coupled with the ex-
istence of foundational theories. There are various such theories, first
and foremost set theory ZFC, but also category theory, and more re-
cently homotopy type theory. There are many features we might want
a foundational theory to have, but one is to provide a generous arena
in which the wide variety of mathematical objects can be studied.1
Roughly, this means that the foundational theory can encode or for-
malise all our informal mathematical discourse about the ‘usual’ ob-
jects of mathematics. In this way, if one had sufficient patience and
time, once could formalise all theorems of informal mathematics as
theorems within one’s favourite foundational theory. The starting ques-
tion of this short paper is: What is the desired relationship between
informal and formalised mathematics?
Being a very general question we restrict attention to the informal
study of concrete structures, like the natural, real or complex numbers
mentioned above; in a philosophical context these are often referred
to as intended structures. Now, it is one thing to be able to formalise
some piece of informal mathematics any-old-how, and quite another
to do so faithfully. We would like the intuitive meaning of the for-
mal statements to be similar to the intuitive meaning of the informal
statements.
For motivational purposes let us roughly distinguish two approa-
ches to the foundations of mathematics: the axiomatic and the genetic
method (see [Rav, 2008]). The first, chiefly embodied by Hilbert, re-
places the intended structure by a set of axioms we argue are (or take
to be) true. When done in first-order logic this approach is often in-
complete (by Go¨del’s results). When done in higher-order logics, we
lose various pleasant meta-theoretic properties, and so whilst of philo-
sophical interest it has less practical value.
The genetic approach is via construction. Instead of asserting ax-
ioms for the intended structure, one first constructs the structure in
question by finding an object coding it in one’s foundational theory,
and then one asks about its properties. Theories with a high degree of
interpretive power are able to translate some mathematical construc-
tions into first-order definitions inside the theory. For example, ZFC
can mimic the classical constructions of the natural, real or complex
1We refer to Maddy [Maddy, 2019] for an assessment of what we want a founda-
tional theory to do for us. The term ‘generous arena’ is her term.
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numbers by defining formulas. In a little more detail (we provide a full
outline in §2) formalisation of the mathematical study of an intended
structure S typically proceeds in two steps. First, S is represented by
a formal object R of the foundational theory (in the case of ZFC, a set
or a class). Second, the informal talk about S is translated to formal
talk about R. Thus, in every model of ZFC we will find an avatar of the
natural, real or complex numbers.
Here, we are concerned with the first step; the choice ofR.2 We will
focus mainly on this style of doing mathematics: by first constructing
the structures and then examining their properties, and especially their
first-order theory. We also restrict attention to first-order theories F to
be our foundational theories (such as ZFC). Our proposal is to analyse
one dimension of the faithfulness or similarity of meaning of a formalisa-
tion as dependent upon the similarity of S and what we define by R.
We thus arrive at a more specific formulation of our question: what
kind of similarity of S and R should we aim for, or at least hope for?
A notion of similarity of obvious interest in this context is elementary
equivalence. Our main claim then reads as follows (see Theorem 14
for a precise statement):
Main Claim. Let F be suitable first-order foundational theory. Given a
particular analysis of faithfulness in terms of elementary equivalence,
an intended structure can be faithfully represented in F if and only if its
(first-order) theory is decidable and F knows some decision algorithm
for it.
For our example structures, this implies that (R, +,×, 0, 1,<) and
(C, +,×, 0, 1) are faithfully representable, but (N, +,×, 0, 1,<) is not.
On the positive side this shows that foundational theories have an es-
pecially good grip on decidable parts of informal mathematics. Our
main interest in the claim is, however, on the negative side. Many
intended structures have undecidable theories, and so their study can-
not be faithfully formalised in our sense. Moreover, the underlying
assessment of faithfulness via elementary equivalence seems to be a
fairly modest requirement on the representation of a structure, philo-
sophically speaking.
Outline: In (§1) we recall some basics about translations between
first-order theories; in particular formalising the study of some in-
tended structure in a foundational theory. We then motivate one way
of understanding the idea of a faithful such formalisation that we shall
2In particular, we are not concerned with the relationship between informal
proofs and formal derivations.
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call absolute representability; an intended structure is absolutely rep-
resentable when its representatives in models of F are elementarily
equivalent to it. In (§2) we establish our main claim by proving Theo-
rem 14. We then (§3) outline an application of our results, specifically
by comparing properties of first-order and higher-order resources in
characterising structures. Finally (§4) we conclude and present some
open questions.
1 Absolute representability
In this section we set up some key notions and motivate the formal
definition we shall use, namely absolute representability.
Recall, a first-order language consists of a set of relation sym-
bols and function symbols, each having an associated natural number
called its arity; we view constant symbols as nullary function sym-
bols. First, we fix a countable such language L and a first-order
L -structure SL : this is our informal intended structure.3 We also
fix a consistent computably enumerable first-order theory F: this is
our foundational theory. We shall add another assumption on F later
when needed. Examples for SL to keep in mind are (N, +,×, 0, 1,<),
(R, +,×, 0, 1,<) or (C, +,×, 0, 1), the example to keep in mind for F
is ZFC; we assume ZFC is consistent.
We employ a standard definition (see e.g. [Ebbinghaus et al., 1994,
Chapter VIII] 4) of how our intended structure SL is represented in F:
Definition 1. A representation R of an L -structure in F is a sequence
of formulas in the language of F, namely a formula ψU(x) such that F
proves ∃xψU(x), and for every r-ary relation symbol S ∈ L a formula
ψS(x1, . . . ,xr) and for every r-ary function symbol f ∈ L a formula
ψf (x1, . . . ,xr, y) such that F proves:
∀x1 · · · ∀xr∀y∀y′(ψf (x1, . . . ,xr, y) ∧ ψf (x1, . . . ,xr, y′)→ y = y′) ∧
∀x1 · · · ∀xr(ψU(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ ψU(xr)→ ∃y(ψU(y) ∧ ψf (x1, . . . ,xr, y)))
Such a representation definably singles out anL -structure in every
model of the foundational theory F as follows.
3Here, we sidestep the discussion as to whether informal mathematics is first-
order or higher-order and content ourselves with the claim that its first-order part is
a substantial one. Note any restriction of attention can only strengthen the negative
interpretation of our main claim.
4There are more general versions that allow ψU (x¯) to have a tuple of free variables
and/or add a formula ψ= interpreting the equality relation; the choice is a matter of
no consequence for us, our choice is for the sake of simplicity.
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Definition 2. LetM be a model of F (with universe denoted M ). The
L -structure R(M) has universe
U := {a ∈M | M |= ψU(a)}
and interprets an r-ary relation symbol S ∈ L by
{(a1, . . . , ar) ∈ U r | M |= ψS(a1, . . . , ar)},
and an r-ary function symbol f ∈ L by the function with the graph
{((a1, . . . , ar), b) ∈ U r × U | M |= ψf (a1, . . . , ar, b)}.
ThatR(M) is a well-definedL -structure follows from the assump-
tions on what F proves about R in Definition 1, namely, the universe U
is non-empty and ψf really defines the graph of some function on U .
Example 3. The usual representation RZFCN of (N, +,×, 0, 1,<) in ZFC is
given taking for ψU(x) the formula x ∈ ω (understood as a formula in
the language {∈} of ZFC) that defines the finite von Neumann ordinals;
the formula ψ<(x1,x2) is x1∈x2, the formulas ψ+(x1,x2, y),ψ×(x1,x2, y)
state the recursive definitions of addition and multiplication, and the
formulas ψ0(y) and ψ1(y) are y=∅ and y={∅}, respectively. The models
RZFCN (M), for M |= ZFC, are called ZFC-standard models of arithmetic
in [Hamkins and Yang, 2013]. We refer to this paper and the references
therein for some information about these structures.
Given a representation R of our intended structure SL in our foun-
dational theory F, it is straightforward to translate first-order talk
about SL into F. The following is folklore (cf. [Ebbinghaus et al.,
1994]):
Lemma 4. Let R be a representation of an L -structure in F. For every L -
sentence ϕ there is a sentence R(ϕ) in the language of F such that for all
modelsM of F:
R(M) |= ϕ⇐⇒M |= R(ϕ). (1)
Moreover, the map ϕ 7→ R(ϕ) is computable.
Proof. (Sketch) We recall the proof for relational L . For atoms define
R(x=y) := x=y and R(S(x¯)) := ϕS(x¯) for S ∈ L a relation symbol.
Then proceed recursively, R(¬ϕ) := ¬R(ϕ), R(ϕ ∧ ψ) := R(ϕ) ∧ R(ψ)
and R(∀xϕ) := ∀x(ϕU(x)→ R(ϕ)).
Remark 5. The proof sketch defines R(¬ϕ) = ¬R(ϕ), a property of
the map ϕ 7→ R(ϕ) that we are going to use. Slightly more generally
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we could use only that F proves (R(¬ϕ) ↔ ¬R(ϕ)) for every ϕ. This
follows from (1) alone: let M be a model of F; then M |= R(¬ϕ) if
and only if R(M) 6|= ϕ by (1), if and only ifM |= ¬R(ϕ) by (1) again.
Similarly, we have the equality R(ϕ ∧ ψ) = R(ϕ) ∧ R(ψ) by the proof
sketch and F-provable equivalence by (1) alone.
The properties of the structureR(M) can vary significantly accord-
ing to the modelM of F. This provides a situation in whichR identifies
very different structures according to the first-order model we live in.
The following question is then salient:
Question. How similar can we make our foundational representative
to the intended structure? More precisely, for a given notion of simi-
larity ∼, does there exist a representation R of L -structures in F such
that SL ∼ R(M) for all modelsM of F?
Here, by a notion of similarity we mean an equivalence relation on
L -structures. The finer this equivalence relation, the stronger the cor-
responding notion of representability. Obviously, taking the identity
for ∼ results in an empty concept: no structure is identically repre-
sentable in F. Taking isomorphism for ∼ means asking whether our
intended structure SL is isomorphically representable in F, i.e., whether
there exists a representation R such that R(M) ∼= SL for allM |= F.
This suggestion for ∼ is naive because it is a quick consequence of the
Compactness Theorem that:5
Proposition 6. Only finite L -structures are isomorphically representable
in F.
Hence isomorphic representability is a far too strong notion (at
least as far as first-order logic is concerned). Philosophers and logi-
cians often analyse a spectrum of similarity notions far coarser than
isomorphism.6 We examine the prospects of choosing elementary
equivalence: recall, two L -structures A,B are elementarily equivalent
if they satisfy the same first-order L -sentences, i.e., Th(A) = Th(B),
or equivalently, Th(A) ⊆ Th(B). Here, Th(A) denotes the first-order
theory of A, i.e., the set of first-order sentences true in A.
The corresponding notion of representability reads as follows:
5This has been noted across the structuralist literature, but is pressed particu-
larly strongly throughout Stewart Shapiro’s seminal defence of second-order logic
in [Shapiro, 1991].
6For example, partial isomorphisms, partial isomorphism calibrated by ordinals,
elementary equivalence for various logics and fragments thereof, bisimilarity, homo-
morphic equivalence. . . the list is long. What is the right similarity notion depends
on the topic under consideration.
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Definition 7. SL is absolutely representable in F if there exists a repre-
sentation R of an L -structure in F such that Th(SL ) = Th(R(M)) for
all modelsM of F; in this case, we say R absolutely represents SL in F.
Example 8. RZFCN from Example 3 does not absolutely represent
(N, +,×, 0, 1,<) in ZFC. Indeed, let Con(ZFC) be an arithmetical sen-
tence expressing the consistency of ZFC. Then Con(ZFC) is true in
(N, +,×, 0, 1,<) but fails in some ZFC-standard models of arithmetic
by Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem.
Given the naturality of elementary equivalence, the question which
structures are absolutely representable in F might deserve our mathe-
matical curiosity. The above example hints at serious limitations, and
we shall exactly delineate them in the next section where we estab-
lish our main claim from the Introduction. For now, we mention two
reasons to find the notion philosophically interesting.
First: Clearly one goal of the informal mathematical investigation
of the intended structure SL is to find out what is true in SL , and first-
order truth is undoubtedly an important part of it. It thus seems that
an absolute representation is a clear desideratum for the foundational
theory. It states that first-order truth in the intended structure does
not vary with different assumptions on the model of the foundational
theory we are living in.
Second: Absolute representation ensures a certain level of stabil-
ity in the informal mathematical investigation of SL with respect to
changes in the foundational theory. Thereby it provides comfort to
the working mathematician who is not willing to restrict his or her
investigations to F alone. For example, if we (consistently) expand F
by adding more axioms, absolute representability of a structure in SL
ensures that we do not change F’s beliefs about what holds in SL by
doing so.7
2 Absolute representability and decidability
In this section we establish our main claim from the Introduction. We
need the following lemma:
7It is important that we compare first-order truth of the intended structure SL
and its formal counterparts R(M) in the informal meta-language. An analogous no-
tion inside F = ZFC would state that Th(R(M)) as defined inM (which, assuming
the universe of R(M) is a set, can be done) does not vary with M. This now in-
cludes non-standard sentences and ceases to be a property of R: this theory can vary
withM even when keeping R(M) fixed; we refer to [Hamkins and Yang, 2013] for
precise statements.
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Lemma 9. Let R be a representation of an L -structure in F. Then R abso-
lutely represents SL in F if and only if
Th(SL ) =
{
ϕ | F ` R(ϕ)}. (2)
Proof. Assume R absolutely represents SL in F. To show ⊆ in (2), let
ϕ ∈ Th(SL ). We have to show that F proves R(ϕ): letM be a model
of F, so ϕ ∈ Th(R(M)) = Th(SL ) by absolute representation, that
is, R(M) |= ϕ, so M |= R(ϕ) by Lemma 4. To show ⊇ in (2) let
ϕ /∈ Th(SL ). Then ¬ϕ ∈ Th(SL ), so F proves R(¬ϕ) = ¬R(ϕ) by
the inclusion just proved. Hence F 6` R(ϕ) because F is consistent.
Conversely, assume (2) and let M |= F. We have to show that
R(M) |= Th(SL ). But, by Lemma 4, R(M) models the right-hand-side
of (2).
Proposition 10. If SL is absolutely representable in F, then Th(SL ) is de-
cidable.
Proof. Given as input an L -sentence ϕ compute R(ϕ) and
¬R(ϕ) = R(¬ϕ) and enumerate all consequences of F (which we
assumed to be computably enumerable). By Lemma 9, exactly one of
R(ϕ) and ¬R(ϕ) is eventually enumerated, and we accept or reject our
input accordingly.
In Example 8 we saw that a particular representation RZFCN is not an
absolute representation. We can now say more:
Example 11. The structures (N, +,×, 0, 1,<) and (N, +,×), being un-
decidable (see [Tarski, 1968]), are not absolutely representable in F.
We now prove a partial converse to the above under an addi-
tional assumption on F: Assume there is a representation RFN of
(N, +,×, 0, 1,<) in F such that F proves RFN(Q) where Q is the conjunc-
tion of the finitely many axioms of Robinson arithmetic. For any F
worth calling a foundational theory, this surely is less than a minimal
requirement (and clearly met by ZFC).
Given this assumption, we note the following direct consequence
of Lemma 4.
Lemma 12. Let ϕ be an arithmetical sentence such that Q proves ϕ. Then F
proves RFN(ϕ).
Proof. LetM |= F. ThenM |= RFN(Q), so RFN(M) |= Q by Lemma 4, so
RFN(M) |= ϕ as Q ` ϕ, soM |= RFN(ϕ) by Lemma 4.
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Let A be an algorithm (i.e. a Turing machine) that halts on every
input. For natural numbers n,m ∈ N, we write A(n) = m to express
that A on input n halts with output m. It is well-known that there is an
arithmetical formula “A(x)=y” with free variables x, y such that for all
n,m ∈ N
A(n) = m =⇒ Q ` “A(n˙)=m˙”,
A(n) 6= m =⇒ Q ` ¬“A(n˙)=m˙”, (3)
where n˙ denotes a canonical term for n (say, 0˙ := 0, 1˙ := 1, 2˙ := 1˙ + 1,
3˙ := 2˙ + 1, . . .).
We now present our notion of what it means for F to “know” an
algorithm deciding Th(Sϕ). Let pϕq denote the Go¨del number of an
L -sentence ϕ.
Definition 13. Let R be a representation of an L -structure in F and
let A be an algorithm. F pointwise verifies A with respect to R if for every
L -sentence ϕ:
F ` (R(ϕ)↔ RFN(“A( ˙pϕq)=1”)). (4)
We should remark here that this definition is rather weak among
various reasonable notions for what it means that F “knows” some
algorithm. Note that the algorithm A and the inputs ϕ are standard
(given in the meta-language), and F is asked to provide a proof of cor-
rectness “pointwise”, i.e., separately for every standard ϕ. Alternative
notions could quantify the algorithm and/or the sentences inside F.
For example, we might require that F proves some sentence express-
ing “there exists an algorithm such that for allL -sentences. . . ” where
the witnessing algorithm might be non-standard but has to work also
for nonstandard sentences. We should also note that our definition
does not require F to prove “A halts on all inputs”.
We view Theorem 14 below as evidence that our notion is the right
one in our context. As its proof shows, F knows in our sense any al-
gorithm deciding the theory of an absolutely representable structure
(Corollary 15). So, indeed, the notion we have defined does not re-
quire much. Philosophically speaking, we might view this knowabil-
ity condition as a mere technicality, and regard our result as showing
that for all practical purposes absolute representability and decidabil-
ity are equivalent.
The following establishes our main claim from the Introduction.
Theorem 14. Let R be a representation of anL -structure in F. Then R ab-
solutely represents SL in F if and only if there exists an algorithm A deciding
Th(SL ) and F pointwise verifies A wrt R.
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Proof. For the forward direction, assume R absolutely represents SL
in F. By Proposition 10, there is an algorithm A deciding Th(SL ). We
claim that F pointwise verifies A wrt R. Let ϕ be an L -sentence. We
show (4) by distinguishing cases.
– Case ϕ ∈ Th(SL ). Then A(pϕq) = 1 as A decides Th(SL ), so
Q ` “A( ˙pϕq)=1” by (3), so F ` RFN(“A( ˙pϕq)=1”) by Lemma 12.
But F ` R(ϕ) by (2) of Lemma 9. Hence F proves both sides of
the equivalence in (4).
– Case ϕ /∈ Th(SL ). Then A(pϕq) 6= 1 as A decides Th(SL ),
so Q ` ¬“A( ˙pϕq)=1” by (3), so F proves RFN(¬“A( ˙pϕq)=1”) by
Lemma 12, and this sentence equals ¬RFN(“A( ˙pϕq)=1”). But
¬ϕ ∈ Th(SL ), so F ` ¬R(ϕ) using (2) and R(¬ϕ) = ¬R(ϕ).
Hence F refutes both sides of the equivalence in (4).
For the converse direction, assume A decides Th(SL ) and F point-
wise verifies A wrt R. We verify (2) of Lemma 9.
For ⊆, let ϕ ∈ Th(SL ). As A decides Th(SL ), we have A(pϕq) = 1,
so Q ` “A( ˙pϕq)=1” by (3), so F ` RFN
(
“A( ˙pϕq)=1”
)
by Lemma 12, so
F ` R(ϕ) by (4).
For ⊇, let ϕ /∈ Th(SL ). Then ¬ϕ ∈ Th(SL ), so F proves
R(¬ϕ) = ¬R(ϕ) by the above. Then F 6` R(ϕ) as F is consistent.
The proof shows:
Corollary 15. Let R be a representation of an L -structure in F and let A
be an algorithm. If R absolutely represents SL in F and A decides Th(SL ),
then F pointwise verifies A wrt R.
Concerning our example structures we get:
Example 16. The structures (N, +), (N,×), (R, +,×, 0, 1,<) and
(C, +,×, 0, 1) have decidable theories [Presburger and Jabcquette,
1991, Mostowski, 1952, Tarski, 1998], and ZFC pointwise verifies their
decision algorithms with respect to their standard representations.
Hence, these structures are absolutely representable in ZFC.
3 An application to foundational debates
We have seen thus far that an intended structure is absolutely repre-
sentable in a first-order foundational theory F if and only if its (first-
order) theory is decidable and F knows some decision procedure for
it. In this section we’ll discuss an application of this observation to the
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debate between proponents of first-order versus higher-order founda-
tions.
An important debate in the philosophy of logic and mathematics
is whether foundations should be conducted in first-order or higher-
order logic (or, if one is more tolerant in outlook, which logic is suited
for what purposes). Throughout this paper, we have explicitly re-
stricted our attention to first-order theories—both with respect to the
foundational theory F under consideration and the theory of informal
mathematics that we are trying to formalise in F.
Many authors argue that our foundational theory should contain
expressive resources greater than first-order, since many notions can-
not be characterised up to isomorphism in first-order logic.8 All of
finiteness, natural number, real number, and various infinite well-
orderings evade characterisation. Logics with greater than first-order
resources at their disposal, by contrast, are able to characterise some
of these notions at the expense of pleasing meta-theoretic properties,
namely compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem by Lindstro¨m’s theo-
rem [Lindstro¨m, 1969], and specifically completeness with respect to
a finitary proof system. There is thus a trade-off between expressive
power and the smoothness of transition between validity and proof.
Our results inform this trade-off by providing bounds on when a
first-order foundational theory can capture truth in an intended struc-
ture. Whilst it is clearly true that for an infinite structure SL , asking for
isomorphic representation of SL is too much, nonetheless our results
show that there are precise conditions on which a first-order theory
can be omniscient concerning truth in SL . This shows that for a cer-
tain class of infinite structures, even first-order logic can have a good
deal of traction (structurally speaking).
On the other side of the coin, we have shown that a foundation
which is both first-order and computably enumerable has limits in ab-
solutely representing theories. The meta-theoretic advantages given
by these two features have their price. Not only will any first-order
foundational theory F fail to determine the cardinality of an intended
infinite structure SL , but if the theory of SL is undecidable F loses
traction on truth in SL too.
8This is argued in various places, but [Shapiro, 1991] is one of the strongest advo-
cates of the use of higher-order resources for certain purposes in foundations.
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4 Conclusion
Recall, we asked for a representation R such that SL and R(M) are
similar for all modelsM of F. Taking similarity as elementary equiv-
alence, we saw that this requires Th(SL ) to be decidable. If it is not, it
is natural to ask for weaker notions of representability.
There are many possibilities and we briefly discuss one of them,
namely the one obtained by weakening the equality in (2) of Lemma 9
to an inclusion: call R a sound representation of SL in F if{
ϕ | F ` R(ϕ)} ⊆ Th(SL ). (5)
Roughly said, F proves only true first-order sentences about SL .
Clearly, the working mathematician studying SL would reject any
foundational theory not providing such a representation.
Proposition 17. Let R be a representation of L -structures in F. Then R is
a sound representation of SL in F if and only if there exists a modelM of F
such that R(M) is elementarily equivalent to SL .
Proof. Assume (5) holds. It suffices to show that the theory
F ∪ {R(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ Th(SL )}
is consistent. Indeed, a modelM of this theory has the property that
R(M) |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Th(SL ) by Lemma 4, so R(M) and SL are ele-
mentarily equivalent. The claimed consistency follows from compact-
ness: if the theory above is inconsistent, then there are finitely many
ϕ1, . . . ,ϕk ∈ Th(SL ) such that F refutes R(ϕ1)∧ . . .∧R(ϕk) = R(ψ) for
ψ := ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk (see Remark 5); as F proves ¬R(ψ) = R(¬ψ) and
¬ψ /∈ Th(SL ), this contradicts (5).
Conversely, if (5) fails, then there exists ϕ /∈ Th(SL ) such that F
proves R(ϕ). By Lemma 4, R(M) |= ϕ for every modelM of F while
SL 6|= ϕ, so R(M) and SL are not elementarily equivalent.
Thus, asking for a sound representation is asking for a special
model M of F, namely one such that R(M) and SL are elementar-
ily equivalent. This makes sense also for other notions of similar-
ity, and in particular for isomorphism. For example, in the case of
(N, +,×, 0, 1,<) the latter asks F to have an ω-model. It is thus philo-
sophically justified to ask F to be more than just consistent, but it is
unclear how much more one should or can ask for.
Another way to weaken the notion of representability, in order
to make it apply to structures with undecidable theories, is to con-
sider only “intended” models M of F, or an expansion thereof for-
mulated using greater than first-order resources. For example, re-
stricting M to transitive standard models of F = ZFC makes RZFCN
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an isomorphic representation of (N, +,×, 0, 1,<); on the other hand,
(R, +,×, 0, 1,<) is absolutely but not isomorphically representable. By
contrast, if we instead formulate ZFC in quasi-weak second-order logic
(where second-order variables are stipulated to range over countable
relations), (R, +,×, 0, 1,<) becomes isomorphically representable. We
therefore ask: Given different “semantic” extensions of F, what natu-
ral structures are absolutely representable but not isomorphically rep-
resentable?9
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